Introduction
Half a decade has passed since the resurgence of international capital flows to many developing countries. About $670 billion of foreign capital has flowed to developing countries in Asia and Latin America in the five years from 1990-94, as measured by the total balance on the capital account of these countries. This is about five times the $133 billion total of the previous five years, when there was a debt crisis and many of these countries had little or no access to international capital markets. Although there was a substantial decline in capital flows to developing countries in the immediate aftermath of Mexico's currency crisis in December 1994, in most cases capital inflows have resumed and by mid-1995 have been sustained at relatively high levels.
The recent surge in capital inflows was initially attributed to domestic developments, such as the sound policies and stronger economic performance of a handful of countries. Eventually, it became clear that the phenomenon was widespread, affecting countries with very diverse characteristics. This pattern suggested that global factors, like cyclical movements in interest rates, were especially important. Moreover, the pattern reflected a growing trend toward integration of world capital markets and globalization of investments.
Capital flows from rich to poor countries are worth studying for a number of reasons. Foreign capital can finance investment and stimulate economic growth, thus helping increase the standard of living in the developing world. Capital flows can increase welfare by enabling households to smooth out their consumption over time and achieve higher levels of consumption. Capital flows can help developed countries achieve a better international diversification of their portfolios and also provide support for pension funds and retirement accounts into the twenty-first century. However, large capital inflows can also have less desirable macroeconomic effects, including rapid monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and widening current account deficits. Hence, a surge in inflows of the magnitudes seen in recent years may pose serious dilemmas and tradeoffs for economic policy, especially in the present environment of high capital mobility.
History has also shown that the global factors affecting foreign investment tend to have an important cyclical component, which has given rise to repeated booms and busts in capital inflows.
1 For example, in Latin America, marked episodes of capital inflows during the 1920s and 1978-1981 were followed by major economic crises and capital outflows, such as in the 1930s and in the mid-1980s. The Mexican balance-of-payments crisis of December 1994 is but a recent example of this phenomenon and highlights the vulnerability of developing capital-importing countries to abrupt reversals; thus, an aim of policy is to reduce that vulnerability.
This paper discusses the principal facts, developments and policies that characterize the current episode of capital inflows to Asia and Latin America. Figure 1 presents evidence on the patterns and magnitude of the flows to these two regions,
while Table 1 presents some basic information about the major economies of Asia and Latin America that are most relevant to our discussion, including the approximate date of the surge in capital inflows, per capita GDP and the size of the capital inflows, as measured by the balance on the capital account as a percentage of GDP from the beginning of the inflow episode through 1994. If the country has enacted 1 Diaz-Alejandro (1983) and Eichengreen (1991) stress the important role played by developments in the major financial centers in affecting the pattern of lending to developing countries. a major inflation stabilization plan, the date when it began is given at the bottom of the table. We begin by discussing the determinants of capital flows to developing countries, with emphasis on the causes behind the heavy inflow of the 1990s. We then discuss the macroeconomic effects of the inflows and whether a policy response might be useful. The final section draws some policy lessons from the recent experiences and discusses areas for future research.
Causes of the Capital Inflows
The factors that encourage or hinder international flows of capital can be categorized into those that are external to the economies receiving the flow and the factors internal to those economies. Several of these factors and trends interacted in the early 1990s to make the developing countries of Latin America and Asia fertile territory for the renewal of foreign lending.
First, there was a sustained decline in world interest rates. For example, shortterm interest rates in the United States were declining steadily in the early 1990s, and by late 1992 they were at their lowest level since the early 1960s. Lower interest rates in the developed nations attracted investors to the high-investment yields and improving economic prospects of economies in Asia and Latin America. Given the high external debt burden of many of these countries, low world interest rates also appear to have improved the creditworthiness of debtor countries that borrow at these rates (FernandezArias, 1993) . The improved creditworthiness and reduced default risk is reflected in the marked rise in secondary market prices of bank claims on most of the heavily indebted countries through February 1994; Figure 2 illustrates the connection. While this turn of events was heralded as good news in most developing countries, policymakers there during the early 1990s became concerned about the sustainability of this favorable interest rate environment. Surely enough, the tightening of monetary policy in the United
States and the resulting rise in interest rates in early 1994 made investment in Asia and
Latin America relatively less attractive. As shown in Figure 2 , higher interest rates quickly and markedly affected developing country debt prices. Indeed, the rise in U.S.
rates also triggered marked corrections in several emerging stock markets. It seems likely that with highly integrated and technologically sophisticated financial markets, changes in relative rates of return will quickly translate into changes in cross-border capital flows.
Also, a growing proportion of investment in Latin America and Asia is "portfolio equity," which refers to financial investments in companies that can easily be altered or withdrawn with little more than the flick of a computer key.
Second, the early 1990s brought recessions to the United States, .Japan and many countries of Europe. This swing of the international business cycle doubtless made profit opportunities in developing countries appear relatively more attractive.
However, as the OECD economies move toward recovery in the mid-1990s, this factor will become less important in generating capital flows to Latin America and Asia.
Third, there has been a trend toward international diversification of investments in major financial centers and toward growing integration of world capital markets (Gooptu, 1993 (Obstfeld, 1986) and the opening of the trade account (Calvo, 1988) , and policies that result in credible increases in the rate of return on investment (such as tax credits). for Asia, they conclude that external factors account for about one-third of bond and equity flows into the region.
Finally
While this discussion has stressed external developments, domestic factors also remain important in both the magnitude and the composition of inflows. Countries with sound domestic fundamentals attracted capital on a larger scale and with a higher proportion of long-term investment. As the cross-country evidence presented
in Edwards (1991) shows, there appears to be a strong link between economic fundamentals and foreign direct investment. An earlier literature on capital flight also documented this link (Dooley, 1988) .
Macroeconomic Effects
We now turn to the macroeconomic effects of the renewal of foreign lending to developing countries. This section describes the basic facts that capture some of the most important aspects of the experience of the largest recipients of capital inflows in Asia and Latin America, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand. Of course, this list of facts is meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. This widening of the current account has usually involved both an increase in national investment and a fall in national saving (of course, the gap between the two is the current account deficit). Investment ratios have risen in most of these countries between 1990 and 1994, while the rate of saving has declined in half of the countries considered (Calvo, Leiderrnan and Reinhart, 1994a) . Some years ago, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that national savings and investment tended to be highly correlated, which they took as evidence that global capital markets
were not yet well developed enough to loosen the linkage between a country's savings and its investment. However, the recent behavior of saving and investment in many of these developing countries implies that these capital markets have become increasingly integrated over the years. Not unexpectedly, high investment and consumption are reflected in higher growth rates for real GDP, as shown in the fourth column of Table 2 . Although it is consistent with the observations made by Frankel (1993a) that the correlations have been declining in the more recent period and by Montiel (1993) , who notes that the correlations appear to be lower for developing countries.
Third, as one would expect from the fall in national saving, there has been a rise in private consumption spending. While disaggregated data on consumption are not available for most of the developing countries, the import data suggests the consumption boom is heavily driven by rising imports of durable goods. This has been particularly true in the Latin American experience including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico.
Fourth, in almost all the countries examined there is rapid growth in the money supply in both nominal and real terms, as shown in the last column of Table 2 .
This follows, logically enough, from the acceleration in economic activity observed in the receiving countries and, in some instances-including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and the Philippines-from a reduction in the opportunity cost of holding money, as domestic inflation was reduced. However, several countries have demonstrated that it was possible, even in the face of large capital inflows (at least in the short run), for the central bank to curb the acceleration in the growth of the money supply. The central bank can do this in two ways. First, it can refrain from intervening in the foreign exchange market and simply allow the domestic currency to appreciate in response to the increased demand for domestic assets. In that case no international reserves are accumulated and no expansion in the monetary base ensues. Alternatively, it can issue domestic bonds to provide for all or most the foreign exchange purchases; that is, the expansionary effect on the monetary base of an increase in central bank holdings of foreign exchange reserves is offset by a reduction in domestic liquidity. Such action by a central bank is referred to as "sterilized intervention." In fact, the cross-country differences in changes in the money supply are largely due to the differences in the degree of sterilization of the capital inflows and the extent to which the authorities were willing to allow a nominal exchange rate appreciation. Sixth, the evidence on the behavior of the real exchange rate presents a mixed picture. As Table 2 shows, in most Latin American countries, capital inflows have been associated with a marked real exchange rate appreciation. 4 In Asia, such an appreciation is only evident in the Philippines; for the remaining Asian countries in Table 2 , the real exchange rate remained surprisingly stable through the inflow period. Here again, domestic policies may reinforce external developments. Consumption booms are a regular feature of exchange rate-based stabilization programs, including the recent Mexican plan (Reinhart and Vegh, 1994) .
Although many reasons surely contribute to these differences in change of the real exchange rate, the composition of aggregate demand may play a key explanatory role. In (Schadler et al., 1993) .
In addition, most of the countries that experienced a substantial real exchange rate appreciation had ongoing inflation stabilization plans during the inflow period.
Some plans, such as Argentina's Convertibility Plan, Brazil's Real Plan and the Mexican plan, used the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. Such appreciations are a well-established empirical regularity of exchange rate-based inflation stabilization plans (Reinhart and Vegh, 1994) .
Modeling the Capital Inflows
These six effects of capital inflows on other key economic variables are not For a debtor country in such a model, a fall in the world interest rate will induce income and substitution effects, which will result in a "consumption boom"
and a widening in the current account deficit. For a debtor nation, a declining interest rate reduces the present value of its debt, which is a positive income effect.
The substitution effect is that since borrowing is now cheaper, consumption should rise. These effects could become even stronger if the country was initially credit rationed in international capital markets, or if the debt is variable rate.
Furthermore, had the Fisherian model included endogenous determination of investment, then the interest rate shock could also translate to a rise in investment.
Together with the lower savings rate (the converse of higher consumption discussed above), this implies a further widening of the current account deficit. Since increases in consumption and investment spending occur for both traded and nontraded goods, and since the latter are in more limited supply than the former, then the rise in demand will result in an increase in the relative price of nontraded goods-which is another way of stating that the real exchange rate appreciates.
An alternate and complementary theoretical approach focuses on the monetary economy, as in the model of Calvo and Vegh (1993) . In this case, similar implications arise from a temporary decline in the international nominal interest rate.
Such a decline in interest rate could happen for reasons outside the control of the capital-importing country. Or it could happen because internal developments such as the implementation of an exchange rate-based inflation stabilization program.
As shown by Calvo and Vegh, if the policy lacks credibility, a discrepancy arises between the current nominal interest rate and its expected higher levels in the future. In such a case, the macroeconomic outcome mimics the case of a temporary decline in international interest rates. This sort of shock also leads to a rise in consumption, an increase in the current account deficit, and a real exchange rate appreciation-much as in the Fisher-type framework. The model also predicts an increase in real money balances, both because it is cheaper to hold money, at least for the present, and because consumption and economic activity is increasing.
In any of these models, the exchange rate regime will affect the monetary consequences of the capital inflows. In most models, consumption and investment booms will be accompanied by a rise in money demand. In a small open economy operating under a free float, capital inflows will be associated with a nominal exchange rate appreciation and no change in either reserves or the monetary aggregates.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, money market equilibrium will be achieved via an accumulation of international reserves at the central bank and a rise in the money supply. For intermediate cases, the degree of monetary expansion following a rise in capital inflows will be smaller to the extent that the inflows are sterilized, or that the nominal exchange rate is allowed to appreciate.
Thus, standard open economy models suggest that a surge in capital inflows is likely to be accompanied by a rise in consumption and investment, an increase in real money balances and foreign exchange reserves, a real exchange rate appreciation, and a widening in the current account deficit. Including other assets in the analysis is likely to indicate that rising inflows would be associated with higher equity and real estate prices. These predicted effects are indeed broadly consistent with what was actually observed in the first half of the 1990s in most of the capital importing countries.
Policy Management of Capital Inflows
Capital inflows to developing countries have often been seen as beneficial by all parties. For the capital-rich developed economies, such investments appear a desirable way of diversifying risk and investing in productive assets that will, in a few decades, fund the retirement of the baby-boom generation. 
Monetary Policy: Sterilization and Regulation
Sterilization has been, by far, the most popular policy response to capital inflows in both Latin America and Asia. This policy aims at insulating the money supply and/or the exchange rate from the effect of the capital inflows; the intent is to mitigate inflationary pressures, the real exchange rate appreciation, and avoid the loss of control over the domestic money stock. 5 However, it is not clear that this policy can provide a lasting solution, and it can be costly. Presumably, funds are being attracted into the country by the promise of higher expected interest rates. But if the capital inflow is sterilized, this will prevent the interest rate differential from narrowing, and may thus induce further capital inflows. In addition, since sterilization involves increasing the number of domestic bonds to offset the currency inflow, it results in an 5 Sterilization would not be needed if domestic agents borrow abroad to finance purchases of imported goods, since in this case the inflows are not intermediated through the domestic financial system. increase in public debt. Eventually, this policy could result in a rise in public debt so large as to undermine the credibility of policymakers, especially if the public begins expecting a partial repudiation of the debt-expectations that may well halt the inflows altogether (Calvo, 1991; Frankel, 1993b) .
Other costs are associated with sterilized intervention. If the central bank were simply to provide its own currency for purposes of foreign exchange without sterilization, it would allow the domestic money supply to increase. The central bank would also end up holding foreign currency, which it could invest in the bonds of the foreign country. However, after selling domestic bonds to sterilize the currency inflow, the central hank must then pay interest on those bonds. To the extent that the interest rate on domestic bonds is higher than that on foreign exchange reserves (which is the case for most developing countries), this entails costs. 6 Annual estimates of these costs in Latin American countries range from 0.25 to 0.80 percent of GDP (Kiguel and Leiderman, 1994) .
Sterilization can take other forms. For example, instead of reducing the money supply by selling bonds, the central bank could raise bank reserve requirements or increase the discount rate. Such steps may be especially relevant in those countries where capital inflows have taken the form of marked increases in local bank accounts.
An increase in reserve requirements (an option used by Chile and Malaysia) lowers the capacity of banks to lend without the quasi-fiscal costs of sterilization.
The regulatory side of monetary policy-that is, bank regulation and supervision can also help, especially in dealing with the risk of macroeconomic destabilization.
For example, regulations that limit the exposure of banks to the volatility in equity and real estate markets, as well as establishing risk-based capital requirements, would be especially timely.
However, many of these policies are not without their costs. They may promote "disintermediation," which refers to new institutions that develop to bypass these regulations. Moreover, greater controls on banks amount to a reversal of the underlying trends of financial liberalization in developing countries.
Controlling Capital Inflows and Liberalizing Capital Outflows
Various countries, such as Chile and Colombia, have imposed taxes on short term borrowing abroad with the intent of discouraging inflows that are thought to be particularly speculative. For example, Chile chose to tax inflows (in effect) by imposing a reserve requirement on international loans intermediated through the banking system. The main disadvantage of such a requirement is that capital flows nlay eventually be rerouted through other channels-for example, the overinvoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports-which may reduce the authorities' control on the financial system. Less explicit capital controls have taken the form of "prudential regulation," usually of the domestic banking system. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand have sought to curb banks' offshore borrowing (a capital inflow) or their foreign exchange exposure by imposing limits on these or tightening existing regulations.
Another response has been to soften the domestic impact of capital inflows by lowering the institutional barriers to capital outflows. However, as shown by Laban and Larrain (1994) , to the extent that lifting restrictions on capital outflows is viewed as a positive step toward economic liberalization, it may increase the confidence of foreign investors and thus may stimulate capital inflows.
Fiscal Policy
As noted earlier, some countries reacted to the surge in capital inflows by tightening fiscal policy, usually via a cut in public expenditures. To the extent that nontradable goods often represent a sizable share of government expenditure, cutting government spending will reduce the demand for nontradables relative to the demand for tradable goods. This step makes nontradables able to buy less of the goods traded on world markets-which effectively means limiting the appreciation of the real exchange rate. However, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited in this situation. Changes in legislation and sensitive political actions usually cannot be undertaken on short notice, which would often be needed to offset the effects of the capital inflows.
Furthermore, optimal fiscal policy considerations suggest that taxes and expenditures be set to reflect long-term goals, rather than in response to what can be excessively volatile fluctuations in international capital markets.
Exchange Rate Policy
A final option for a capital-importing country is to let the nominal exchange rate appreciate in response to capital inflows. The main advantage of allowing greater exchange rate flexibility is that the appreciation in the real exchange rate is likely to occur through a change in the nominal exchange rate and not through higher inflation. Moreover, exchange rate flexibility might strengthen the degree of autonomy of domestic monetary policy precisely when central bank's function as "lender of last resort" might be needed-for example, during a temporary sub sequent reversal of capital inflows.
A disadvantage of a pure float is that it may be associated with high volatility in the real exchange rate. Massive and rapid capital inflows may induce such a steep and rapid exchange rate appreciation that it may damage the competitiveness of strategic sectors for economic growth, like nontraditional exports. It is even possible that a sufficiently large real exchange rate appreciation, in a model with sunk costs, can induce hysteresis in the trade balance and thereby alter the steady-state real exchange rate (Baldwin and Lyons, 1994 
Concluding Remarks
Although Gauging by their economic performance and their ability to withstand the adverse side effects of the Mexican crisis, the countries that have been the most successful in managing capital flows (for example, Chile and Malaysia) have implemented a comprehensive policy package and not relied on a single instrument. At the outset of the surge in inflows, these countries reacted by treating the inflows as temporary and resisted a nominal exchange rate appreciation; the foreign exchange intervention was mostly sterilized. As the inflows persisted, sterilization efforts were scaled back and the domestic currency was allowed to appreciate. To moderate the extent of the real appreciation and prevent the economy from overheating, fiscal policy was tightened. To moderate the volume of the inflows and lengthen their maturities, exchange rate flexibility was increased and measures to curb inflows were implemented.
A less productive policy mix has consisted of persistent sterilized intervention (which keeps short-term interest rates comparatively high), heavy intervention in the foreign exchange market (which results in little short-run exchange rate uncertainty) and no controls on short-term capital movements. All of these policies have tended to provide especially strong incentives for short-term capital inflows.
To a large extent, this policy mix characterized the Mexican experience through most of the early 1990s. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that the severity of the Mexican crisis would have been lessened had the inflows (which became outflows) been smaller, had their maturity been longer and had the inflows been accompanied by a much smaller decline in domestic saving than that actually observed.
The surge of capital inflows to Asia and Latin America in the first half of the 1990s is an enormous and multidirrlensional natural experiment, one that economists will be studying for years to come. Let us now tun1 to a few questions this research could address. For example, theoretical models are clear in their predictions for the real exchange rate in response to an increase in capital inflows. However, despite capital flows of similar orders of magnitudes and often common policy responses, the real exchange rate has shown a stronger tendency for appreciation in Latin America than in Asia. Future research might try to account for these differences.
In the last two decades, several Latin American stock markets experienced a boom-bust cycle of proportions not seen in industrial countries in the post-World War I1 period. These events provide an ideal testing ground for "bubbles" hypotheses and may help understand asset price behavior in emerging markets.
Relatively little is known about how international capital flows are intermediated. In what measure are the developing countries prepared to deal with such shocks?
Applied research in these areas will have to provide better measures of credibility and time-varying risk. This task is a difficult one. As discussed in this paper, capital inflows may provide ambiguous signals to market participants. Inflows may reflect renewed confidence about favorable medium-and long-term investment opportunities in the receiving country. Alternatively, capital may pour in for purely speculative purposes to a country where the lack of credibility in government policies leads to high return on domestic financial assets. Attempting to accomplish this task is essential to a better understanding of the forces driving the cycles in foreign lending to developing countries, and to gauging the vulnerability of developing countries to a reversal of such capital flows.
